



PKSOI BULLETIN

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Director's Corner

Welcome to this 4th edition of the PKSOI Bulletin. Our theme for this quarter is Landpower and the bulletin is again filled with contributions from a variety of practitioners within the stability operations arena. This summer, we were fortunate to have several interns from civilian and military academic institutions working with us and we've included some of their contributions. It's not often that college students are published in forums such as ours, so we hope you will enjoy their fresh perspectives.



COL John Kardos,
Director PKSOI

In other news . . . In January 2009, HQDA directed that the Commander, Combined Arms Center (CAC) become the US Army Force Modernization Proponent for Stability Operations and Security Force Assistance. In this role, CAC will integrate efforts across the Army related to Doctrine,

Organization, Training, Material, Logistics, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF). To assist in that process, PKSOI created a SO Campaign Plan aligned with the Army Action Plan for Stability Operations. The plan was expanded and refined through a Campaign Development Workshop at Fort Leavenworth in late June. If you have a role in this effort (i.e., developing Army capabilities and capacity), and have not yet been involved, contact PKSOI or the SO/SFA Proponency Office at CAC, so that you can be sent the appropriate information.

Again, welcome to this issue. As always, we solicit your contributions and critiques.

What do you think? Do you have something to say?

Something to add to our Event list?

*The next bulletin topic will look at Mainstreaming
Stability Operations*

Send your letter or articles for submission to PKSOI Publications Coordinator @ [e-mail](#) or through the "Contact Us" at the [PKSOI Website](#) no later than 15 September 2009 for our next Bulletin. Provide sufficient contact information. Bulletin Editor may make changes for format, length, and inappropriate content only and in coordination with original author.

There is no suspense for submissions related to our Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Topic List. You may send your manuscript directly to the Chief, Policy and Knowledge Management Division (PKM), PKSOI.

[Contact us](#)

If you are a "blogger" and would like to check out our blogs related to Peace and Stability Operations please visit our website and make comments. You may also visit our Book Review section where we feature comments by the author and topical Subject Matter Experts.

[PKSOI Blogs](#)

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DOD INVOLVEMENT IN INTER-AGENCY EFFORTS: CURRENT OPERATIONS AND FUTURE VALUE

by Cadet Margaret Fountain

"We as a nation must strengthen not only our military capabilities, but also reinvigorate other important elements of national power and develop the capability to integrate, tailor, and apply these tools as needed. We must tap the full strength of America and its people."¹

-2008 National Defense Strategy



In a progressively more complicated security environment, the United States Government (USG) is facing increasingly complex threats to American interests. In this environment, where situations are rarely neatly defined and threats carry components of economic, political, and military concern, the USG is implementing an equally comprehensive solution: interagency operations. Interagency operations seek to solve America's multifaceted security problems with equally multifaceted solutions, unifying American power across the spectrum of government agencies in order to utilize the full force of our capabilities. This idea is expressed in the 2006 National Security Strategy when it states:

- ◇ These [current] challenges are not traditional national security concerns, such as the conflict of arms or ideologies. But if left unaddressed they can threaten national security. Preparing for and managing these challenges requires the full exercise of national power, up to and including traditional security instruments².

This full exercise of national power is exactly what interagency operations are designed to produce. Interagency operations bring together all agencies of government, whether civilian or military based to tackle America's security concerns in a partnered approach, with the intended outcome of each using their unique expertise to create the best possible solution. This integrated approach ensures that all components, economic, political, social, and military are taken into account and adequately addressed.

Accordingly, the Department of Defense (DoD) has taken a renewed interest in interagency operations in recent years, boosting its capabilities to perform in an interagency environment in both a supported and supporting role. This paper will focus on how the DoD contributes to interagency operations, the importance of DoD contributions and the way ahead for DoD in interagency operations.

Foundations of DoD Interagency Involvement

The involvement of the DoD in interagency operations has been set forth in a series of executive and joint publications. The earliest manifestation of formal DoD interagency efforts, the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program created by the National Security Action Memorandum 362, "Responsibility for U.S. Role in Pacification (Revolutionary Development)" integrated for the first time civilian decision-makers into the military command and resource structure.³

Lessons learned from that first interaction over forty years ago were largely ignored in the decades after Vietnam's conclusion and the more recent interagency directives both build upon and strike out fresh from its legacy. Interagency efforts were again brought to the forefront in a meaningful capacity in December 2005 by the National Security Defense Directive 44 (NSPD-44). This document, while specifically tailored to stabilization and reconstruction operations, prioritized coordination between civilian agencies and the DoD specifically directing the Department of State (DoS, the lead agency) and the DoD to conduct "harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations [which]...may be integrated with military contingency plans and doctrine."⁴ NSPD-44 reintroduced interagency efforts to the DoD as a formal priority demanding attention.

While NSPD-44 provided more urgency to DoD development of interagency capabilities, the DoD had already identified the need for such development. In November 2005 DoD had already issued Defense Directive 3000.05 "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTR)". This document outlined the specific responsibilities of the DoD in the SSTR environment, particularly emphasizing the need for military interaction with civilian agencies. DoDD 3000.05 emphasized what are now staples of the DoD interagency process, joint planning, education, and mutual support. The directive communicates an open, participative mentality on the part of DoD. DoDD 3000.05 emphasizes the importance of two way communications noting that "assistance and advice will be [both] provided to and sought from"⁵ DoD and partner agencies as part of the integrated process. The directive communicates the overall endstate of DoD interagency interaction as the ability to:

- ◇ Work closely with relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, global and regional international organizations (IGOs), U.S. and foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private sector individuals and for-profit companies.⁶

Here DoD clearly stated its commitment to interagency processes, recognizing the importance of developing interagency capabilities in the current security environment. With DoDD 3000.05 and NSPD-44 in place the DoD has rapidly integrated the interagency approach into current DoD operations.

Current DoD Paradigms for Interagency Efforts

The DoD has taken several routes to better integrate the concepts of interagency efforts in the vernacular of DoD missions. Some of these measures have been successful, while others have yet to bear the fruit that was promised with their development, but all have made contributions in how the DoD approaches interagency efforts in the current environment. The following pages offer only a brief overview of a few of the more notable programs and examples of some of the DoD's interagency policy at work in today's sensitive environments, particularly Iraq and Afghanistan.

In use since the mid 1990s, one of the DoD frameworks for interagency operations is the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC). The CMOC employed in interagency efforts is modeled upon a civil affairs concept and serves as the point of contact between the Joint Force Commander (JFC), USG agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and private sector for operational and tactical levels of civil-military operations (CMO).⁷ The CMOC is not involved in setting policy but rather serves as a forum in which all players, DoD, USG agency, IGO, and NGO collaborate to produce a unified effort.⁸ It is not simply impractical, but also impossible for the JFC to be expected to direct all participating players within their command with absolute authority and this is an end state neither aimed at nor supported by the CMOC. Indeed, the CMOC enforces the individuality of the partner agencies while integrating their unique contributions and suggestions into the operations processes producing a "cooperative spirit among all participants."⁹

Another more recent manifestation of DoD's involvement with interagency efforts is the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). The JIACG has a purpose similar to that of the CMOC. Meant to bring together civilian and military planning at the operation level for the Combatant Commander (CCDR), the JIACG fully integrates interagency planning by placing "a civilian-oriented interagency element" directly on the CCDR staff.¹⁰ The JIACG is designed to be the civilian agency information conduit to the CCDR with its primary purpose to "provide the CCDR with the primary and readily available integration venue for coordination of interagency efforts with joint force actions."¹¹ JIACGs help the CCDR by untangling the lines of communication between the Combatant Command (COCOM) and Washington on COCOM issues, easing the integration of interagency and DoD capabilities into a mutually supportive framework.

Existing as an embedded resource the JIACG allows both the COCOM and its USG agency partners to learn in close proximity each other's capabilities and intent producing a more effective, impactful partnership.¹²

Similar to the CMOC, the JIACG is designed to facilitate a "fusing" of USG agency and COCOM contributions to "achieve a harmonization of efforts."¹³

The Provincial Reconstruction Team: A Marriage of Land Power and Interagency Operations

While JIACGs and CMOCs are currently defining the DoD's involvement with interagency efforts at the strategic and operational levels, with major roles played by the CCDRs and JFCs, interagency efforts are also causing a direct impact on how DoD forces operate on the ground. The most significant examples of this are the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) currently deployed throughout Iraq and Afghanistan. A PRT is an "interim civil-military organization" whose mission is "to improve stability in a given area by helping build the host nation's legitimacy and effectiveness in providing security to its citizens and delivering essential government services."¹⁴ PRTs integrate the capabilities of military forces (who provide security for the PRT and conduct stability operations in the PRT AOR) and civilian agency contributors whose representatives oversee and advise on PRT projects and initiatives. The PRTs currently employed in both Afghanistan and Iraq share conceptual foundations and missions but are not identical. Indeed, the PRTs involved in OEF and OIF differ in some significant ways.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan

An original development of *Operation Enduring Freedom* (OEF) Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were first fielded in Afghanistan in late 2002. With the sole exception of the PRT in Panj Shir Province, each PRT is commanded by a military officer whose special responsibilities focus on coordination, direction, and security sector issues and who remains in the theater military chain of command. For the other stabilization sectors (e.g., governance and reconstruction), the PRT leads are civilian officials under authority of the US Ambassador, also sometimes called the Chief of Mission (COM), who is responsible by law and direction of the President for all executive branch agency personnel (except for those under command of the geographic combatant commander) and coordination of all USG programs in the country.¹⁵ Approximately 100-person strong PRTs in Afghanistan consist of a large military contingent (comprised of civil affairs teams, infantry, military police, PSYOPS, EOD, intelligence, medics, and the command staff team) and select civilian agency representatives from DoS, USDA, and USAID.¹⁶

The first iteration of PRTs in Afghanistan were commanded by either an Army or Marine Corps officer, with the military billets being filled by either soldiers or marines. Since 2006, however, Afghanistan's PRTs in most cases have been under the command of Air Force *and Navy officers*, with airmen and sailors filling the functional billets once staffed by soldiers and marines. Each PRT maintains an infantry platoon from the Army National Guard, an E-7 or E-8 to serve as senior NCO, and approximately 15 civil affairs soldiers from the U.S. Army Reserves, but all other military positions in the PRTs are now filled by sailors and airmen. This shift was implemented in order to integrate the Air Force and Navy into current operations in Afghanistan and close the gap in combat experience between the two services and the historically more engaged Army and Marine Corps.¹⁷ The civilian staffing in the current PRTs remains unchanged.

Together, PRT players combine their efforts to progress in three main areas: governance, security, and reconstruction. In strengthening governance, the PRT tries to promote the authority of the central government and its appointed agents and diminish the influence of those who threaten this authority. As part of this mission, the PRTs work closely with the Afghan provincial council members and provincial governor (who is appointed by the central government in Kabul).¹⁸ In contrast to this broad responsibility PRTs' security mandate is very limited, extending only to the force protection of the PRT members and assets. The range of operations broadens again with the PRTs' reconstruction mandate whose aim is to "demonstrate goodwill and encourage a favorable reaction to [the PRT's] presence" by improving local quality of life through building schools, clinics, roads, irrigation systems, and other public infrastructure.¹⁹

Working toward these three objectives Afghanistan's PRTs have experienced both successes and challenges as they have come together in the interagency environment. Great strides have been made towards bolstering the authority of the central Afghan government through the simultaneous efforts of DoS political advisors and civil affairs teams. Afghanistan's infrastructure continues to improve thanks to the USDA and USAID advisors, and U.S. Army funds that the PRTs pour into their AORs. While the integration of civilian and military capabilities is the source of much of their success, friction between the civilian and military components also contributes to many of the problems facing Afghanistan's PRTs. Civilian and military personnel have yet to negotiate clear pre-agreements as to mandates, roles, missions, and job descriptions leading to confusion over where authority rests within the PRT.²⁰ This friction is further irritated by the lack of pre-deployment training and resourcing provided to the civilian PRT personnel by their parent agencies, which are undermanned and under resourced themselves.²¹ Since 2006 DoD has addressed this particular issue by including the civilian agency PRT personnel in the 90-day pre-deployment

training that all PRTs undergo stateside, giving all PRT participants time to acclimate to each other before entering the operational environment. This has dramatically lessened the conflict of cultures between the civilian and military PRT components, promoting better cohesion of the PRT on deployment.²² Another source of friction was strained relationships between the PRTs and humanitarian or developmental organizations that were operating within the PRTs' AORs. These organizations have widely criticized Afghanistan's PRTs for using soldiers in reconstruction operations and thereby "blurring the lines" between U.S. combatants and non-combatants (like NGO personnel) in the region.²³ They argue this places their personnel at greater risk, decreasing the effectiveness of the overall reconstruction mission in Afghanistan.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq

While also directed at the improvement of the general stability of their AOR, PRTs in Iraq share fewer similarities to those in Afghanistan than one might assume. Structurally, Iraq's PRTs are almost completely dissimilar from those operating in Afghanistan. Led by a senior DoS Foreign Service Officer (FSO) rather than a military officer, Iraq's PRTs are much more heavily weighted with civilian personnel.²⁴ Indeed, in comparison to Afghanistan PRTs' meager civilian staffing, PRTs in Iraq include civilian representatives from the Departments of State, Justice, Agriculture (USDA), USAID, and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in addition to having contracted civilian cultural and governance advisors.²⁵ These drastic structural differences change the distribution of responsibility within the PRT and have a considerable impact on their operations.

Despite these differences in structure, and the resulting differences in operations, the fundamental objectives of PRTs in Iraq remain fundamentally the same as those of their Afghanistan models with only slight modifications. PRTs in Iraq, as in Afghanistan, are aimed at improving the authority and legitimacy of the central government. However in Iraq the priority is to develop initiative and strength in the provincial governments long stifled by Saddam Hussein's crushing rule. Security is more limited for Iraq's PRTs than in Afghanistan as the larger civilian contingent places more stress on its organic force protection detachment. Iraq's PRTs are much more dependent on combat forces for security and resources, leading to tension among some PRTs and combat units.²⁶ PRT reconstruction efforts in Iraq are more structured than those in Afghanistan. However, once initiated they are not under PRT supervision.²⁷

While the program is still growing, the PRTs in Iraq, as in Afghanistan, have experienced both notable successes and challenges. Through the cooperation of USAID officials (the lead element), military, DoS representatives, and Iraqi

government officials, PRTs in Iraq have developed sophisticated programs to plan and resource (with both U.S. and Iraqi funds) reconstruction projects.²⁸ Grassroots initiatives from PRT civilian governance contractors have helped educate provincial Iraqi officials, thus increasing their competency and legitimacy in the eyes of their constituents.²⁹ Military force protection detachments and, in some cases, combat units shelter civilian PRT delegations, allowing them to go “outside the wire” to interact with the Iraqi population they serve.³⁰

However, notwithstanding the great strides PRTs in Iraq are making, they are also facing some tough challenges. One of those challenges is staffing. With a much higher number of civilian positions, Iraq’s PRTs are facing severe understaffing, as the civilian agencies struggle to recruit. Indeed, even though the DoS is the lead agency for Iraq’s PRTs, only 82% of all DoS PRT assignments have been filled. Even worse is USAID’s situation, with only 60% of its positions filled (this includes contracted employees).³¹ For those civilians who volunteer to serve on PRTs, training and relevant experience are issues. PRT volunteers tend to be more junior, and while they are willing to serve in a hostile environment, they often lack true subject matter expertise needed to fulfill their designated role. As in Afghanistan, Iraq’s PRTs also suffer from inherent civil-military tension, most of which is born from mutual misunderstanding. Participating USG and military personnel fail to settle on an “agreed concept of operations” and confusion over responsibilities and overlaps results in tension that often stymies progress.³²

Building Relationships: The Future of DoD Interagency Efforts

Whether it is with the development of the JIACG or the implementation of PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan, the DoD is making great progress incorporating USG agencies into their operations at all levels. Demonstrating the DoD’s continued commitment to improving its participation in interagency efforts is its newest interagency initiative from Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM): the rewriting of JP3-08 “Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Non-governmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations”.

The current version, first published in March 2006, is separated into two lengthy volumes, detailing the then-current state of DoD joint interagency doctrine. With a wealth of experience and many security environment changes over the past three years, the update to JP3-08 will be an important step in institutionalizing USG lessons learned and streamlining the interagency process. The new JP3-08 will more relevant, user-friendly, and accessible than its predecessor.

Slimmed down to one volume, the rewrite of JP3-08 aims to provide a current off-the-shelf reference for CCDRs and their interagency partners. The drafting process itself speaks to the DoD’s increasing commitment to interagency efforts. USJFCOM has already sought to integrate the input of interagency partners and advisory institutions, such as the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), in order to capture the perspectives of all interagency players. Integrating interagency partners early in the drafting process is USJFCOM’s attempt to produce a more relevant document, for all players in the interagency process, and speaks highly to their commitment to developing interagency capabilities.

Since the implementation of the CORDS program in Vietnam, interagency efforts have been instruments of national power. Losing significance in the shadow of the Cold War, many valuable interagency lessons learned were lost as the USG focused its energies on the linear Soviet threat. Now, however, the threats facing the United States are no longer linear and USG officials have recognized the need to include USG agencies in their response. The corresponding complexity of interagency efforts, while well-suited to the current security environment, brings its own set of unique challenges to DoD and USG agency officials. Key players on both sides must learn to work through cultural and organizational differences. The way man-power and funds are resourced to interagency initiatives needs to be relooked. More cross-communication must be built into the system. The proliferation of interagency experiences, such as the PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the continuation of programs to institutionalize and develop interagency doctrine like the rewrite of JP3-08 are doing much to solve these problems. These initiatives represent a powerful investment of both the DoD and USG agencies in the future of interagency efforts; a sign that while these programs have much to overcome, interagency operations have the support necessary to eventually prevail.

¹National Defense Strategy 2008., ²National Security Strategy 2006., ³Dale Anrade and LTC U.S. Army (Ret.) James H. Willbanks, “CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future” in *Military Review*, March-April 2006. Accessed online at: <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDocAD=ADA489376&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>, ⁴National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44, December 7, 2005. Page 3, ⁵Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations.” November 28, 2005. Page 3, ⁶Ibid, ⁷Joint Publication 3-57, “Civil-Military Operations.” USJFCOM. July 8, 2008. Chapter II, pg 26. Accessed online at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_57.pdf, ⁸Ibid, ⁹JP3-57, Chap.2, pg. 57, ¹⁰“Joint Interagency Coordination Group Fact Sheet,” USJFCOM Public Affairs. Accessed online at: http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_jiacg.htm, ¹¹“Commander’s Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group,” USJFCOM: Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Innovation and Experimentation Directorate. March 1, 2007. Chap.3, pg 2. Accessed online at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/other_pubs/jiacg_hanbook.pdf, ¹²Ibid, pg 6, ¹³Ibid, ¹⁴“PRT Playbook: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures,” Center for Army Lessons Learned. September 2007. Chap.1, pg 1, ¹⁵Ibid, Chap. 6, pg 23, ¹⁶Robert M. Perito, “Special Report: The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, Lessons Identified.” United States Institute for Peace.

October 2005. Pages 4-5, ¹⁷ The information in this section is from retired Army PRT First Sergeant Robert Browne, in-person interview, 16 June 2009, ¹⁸Ibid, ¹⁹“Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan”, Page 9, ²⁰Ibid, 11, ²¹Ibid, ²²Last two sentences from: retired Army PRT First Sergeant Robert C. Browne, in-person interview, 16 June 2009, ²³Ibid, 9, ²⁴Robert M. Perito, “Special Report: Provincial Reconstruction Teams In Iraq”, United States Institute for Peace, March 2007. Page 4, ²⁵Ibid, ²⁶Ibid, 8, ²⁷Ibid, 8-9, ²⁸Ibid, ²⁹Ibid, 7, ³⁰“Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq”, 8, ³¹Ibid, 4, ³² Ibid.

Cadet Margaret Fountain, *United States Military Academy class of 2010, studied counter-terrorism, civil military integration and peacekeeping operations at the Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany. While supporting PKSOI, she participated in the review of joint/interagency doctrine and prepared an analytical paper on how to achieve a safe and secure environment during peace operations for the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations.*

Using Undergraduate Civil-Military Education to Facilitate Future Whole-of-Government Operations

by 2ndLt Jesse Sloman

The Problem

At the end of 2007, with the US deeply involved in two major conflicts, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates gave a landmark speech at Kansas State University. Rather than calling for an increase in military spending, more troops on the ground or better weapons systems, the Secretary made a startling claim. “If we are to meet the myriad challenges around the world in the coming decades,” he argued, “military success is not sufficient to win.” Instead, the Secretary suggested that combining “civilian involvement and expertise” with the competencies of the Armed Forces would be crucial if we hoped to successfully confront the problems of the 21st century.¹

Unfortunately, standing in the way of an integrated, whole-of-government (WoG) approach to national security is a vast cultural and institutional gap between civilian agencies and the U.S. military. Service members are task-oriented, view events in a linear fashion, and recognize a strict chain-of-command with clear responsibilities and authorities. Civilian personnel, on the other hand, tend to shy away from formalized methods and procedures, dislike hierarchies in favor of a more egalitarian leadership style, and generally have longer time-horizons than the military. These institutional differences grow out of the different nature of their respective organizational responsibilities: warfighting versus ‘softer’ competencies such as diplomacy or development aid. The challenge the U.S. faces as it seeks to move to a whole-of-government crisis response is blending these very different institutions, cultures, and constructs. To that end, the USG initiated a host of measures, which includes the creation of

the State Department Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and the formation of the Interagency Management System (IMS).

While they are meaningful steps in the right direction, these new structures and directives nevertheless fall short of comprehensively addressing the civil-military cultural gap.

For the majority of civil servants at the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Justice, and others, the military is a little-understood entity with strange rituals, rites, and ways of doing business. In this respect, the WoG dilemma encompasses the wider problems posed by the nation’s growing societal civil-military gap.

Today, just one half of one percent of Americans serve in the military.² Yellow bumper stickers abound, reflecting the tremendous respect and admiration the American people have for the Armed Forces—polls show the military remains the most respected U.S. government institution—but respect does not equal depth of knowledge or familiarity.³ Americans may like the Armed Forces, but they are still largely disconnected from them. This problem is as true throughout the U.S. government, civil society, and others who may be called upon to work alongside the Armed Forces, as it is for society at large. Closing the civil-military gap will not be easy. Some have proposed a new national draft to expand popular exposure to the Armed Forces, though this idea is effectively a non-starter so long as the nation’s leaders do not seek a significant military expansion. On a smaller scale, there are initiatives to increase civil-military understanding within the government, such as the creation of a National Security Professional Development program to “enhance the ability of national security professionals to safeguard the Nation.”⁴

Yet, despite the USG’s new focus on facilitating WoG cooperation, the undergraduate arena has been largely ignored thus far. Universities represent a missed opportunity for facilitating civil-military understanding; college is the last universal experience that nearly all future professionals, regardless of specialty, undergo before beginning careers. It is the formative intellectual stage for many students, a process that is meant to challenge assumptions and expose new concepts and ideas to those about to enter ‘the real world.’

Unfortunately, the university is also an environment that is becoming increasingly disconnected from the Armed Forces. This problem is particularly acute at the most competitive universities, few of which host Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs or any other military presence beyond a handful of officers participating in graduate fellowship programs. The Armed Forces may be addressed in the abstract in some classes, such as those focusing on security studies or history, but the uniformed services are basically ignored both practically and



academically. At a time when the United States is engaged in two major wars with a defense budget exceeding the next 45 highest-spending nations combined, this level of ignorance is troubling.⁵ It also inhibits effective WoG operations because critical personnel, such as civil servants, NGO employees, and others working alongside the military in reconstruction and stabilization missions, lack an adequate level of baseline knowledge about the Armed Forces.

Universities offer one more benefit of exposing students to knowledge about the military and the interagency process: they provide a space for educating students before those individuals become institutionalized and intellectually stove-piped by professional experiences, education, and training. College students may suffer from a lack of direct experience and first-hand knowledge, but they are also free from the prejudices, biases, and scars of ancient turf battles that can be a hindrance for civil or military personnel attempting to engage in WoG efforts. The undergraduate arena should be seen as a vital time to inculcate students with the unique mindset required for effective interagency cooperation, one that prizes the most efficient and effective achievement of WoG objectives over parochial protectionism and squabbling about rice bowls.

The Way Forward: Undergraduate Civil-Military Education

To maximize its effects, an undergraduate civil-military education should be focused on three primary lines of effort: academic instruction, training, and relationship building. Students must be educated about the military to include its makeup, roles and missions, service culture, and history; the interagency process; and reconstruction and stabilization operations. This will provide them with an important base of knowledge about these critical components of our government. Training events will allow students to move from the academic to the practical by applying their classroom lessons in a field setting. Lastly, through relationship building—meeting with and working alongside military personnel—undergraduates will find their prejudices challenged and their interest in national security expanded. They will also make personal connections that could potentially pay dividends down the road in a real-world scenario. As a former USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team member once told me: “the best time to get to know one another is before a crisis, not during one.”

An example of best practices in undergraduate civil-military education is the Alliance Linking Leaders in Education and the Services (ALLIES) program at Tufts University’s Institute for Global Leadership, the US Military Academy (USMA), the US Naval Academy (USNA), and the US Air Force Academy (USFA). I became involved with ALLIES during its nascent stages and went on to serve as the student co-chair for nearly two years.

During that time, I saw ALLIES grow from a handful of Tufts students to include full-fledged chapters at the Service Academies and participation in conferences, international research trips, and exercises. With recurring internships at the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), the State Department’s S/CRS, and the National Defense University, ALLIES is exposing students to cutting-edge WoG developments before they begin their professional lives, whether in uniform, government, civil society or the private sector.

ALLIES structures its activities along the three lines of effort identified above: academics, training, and relationship building. Academic programming is designed to establish basic knowledge as well as explore military dimensions of well-known public issues. For example, ALLIES worked with one of Tufts’ philanthropic organizations to hold an event on Darfur, a perennial campus hot-topic. The panel discussion went beyond simple calls for international intervention. Instead, it focused on the logistical, operational, and legal challenges inherent in peacekeeping and stability operations, challenges that are frequently glossed-over at civilian universities that do not benefit from the expertise of military professionals. Attendees left the event with a much more nuanced understanding of the strengths and limitations of armed intervention.

Similarly, ALLIES seeks to expose civilians to the operating techniques and procedures of the Armed Forces. One event during the summer of 2008 brought Tufts students to Quantico, VA, where they participated in a capabilities exercise with the Marine Corps’ 4th Civil Affairs Group. The students were able to act as civilian role-players, permitting them to both observe first-hand a full-scale military exercise and provide support for training Marines. Although they were all undergraduates, their experiences in ALLIES prepared them to realistically play members of the interagency team.

At as many events as is feasible, ALLIES seeks to combine Tufts civilian students with peers in ALLIES chapters at the service academies. Cadets and midshipmen routinely travel to Tufts to take part in programs while Tufts students visit the academies to participate in conferences and symposia. During one of ALLIES’ annual capstone events, the Joint Research Project (JRP), civilian and military students conduct a month-long international research project on an issue that cuts across civil-military lines. Last year, 11 students from Tufts, USNA, and USMA visited Jordan to explore the impact of the Iraq war on Jordan’s political reform process, Jordanian-U.S. security cooperation, and the impact of Iraqi refugees in Jordanian society. Participants not only examined important issues pertaining to Jordan, but also learned to overcome—albeit at a micro level—the same cultural and institutional differences that currently afflict WoG planning and operations.

The makeup of the 2008 JRP students illustrates the value of fostering civil-military understanding at the undergraduate level. Of the 11 participants, five will enter the Armed Forces (all four services are represented), while others are pursuing paths such as a masters degree in public health, working as a journalist in Lebanon, interning in Geneva at the World Health Organization, or interning on Capitol Hill. These ALLIES members will bring an informed understanding of civil-military challenges—one formed at the academic, practical, and personal levels—to a wide variety of fields and professions, all of which will be better served by their expertise. They will grow into civilian and military leaders well equipped to manage the WoG approach necessary to be successful in the face of complex, multi-sectoral security challenges.

Recommendations

To facilitate the growth of undergraduate civil-military educational programs similar to ALLIES, the U.S. government should take a number of steps. Firstly, formal professor exchanges between civilian universities and the military's academic institutions should be created. Exchanges such as these would be beneficial for both civilian and military colleges, each of which would gain professors with diverse expertise not normally found at their respective institutions. At civilian universities, military professors could act as cultural ambassadors, familiarizing students with the Armed Forces as well as spearheading and coordinating efforts to create more civil-military educational opportunities along the lines of ALLIES.

Secondly, the DoD should take advantage of the one program that does provide an on-campus military presence: ROTC. Rather than a single-minded focus on commissioning future officers, the mission of the ROTC program should be expanded to place equal emphasis on outreach to non-military students. Instead of construing ROTC simply as a military preparation course, the program should be seen as a means of promoting understanding and education about the Armed Forces. Through leadership courses, summer events, campus discussion sessions, and academic classes, ROTC should make itself an attractive option for students with no desire to serve in uniform but who still seek to gain more exposure to the military.

It is important to note that education and exposure does not mean propagandizing or promoting. Unless the military's efforts are consistent with the intellectual freedom of academia, skeptics are more likely to be alienated than interested. At ROTC-sponsored panel discussions, for example, a variety of opinions should be represented whether or not they are congruent with the DoD's official positions. By showing that the military can accept, facilitate, and even encourage honest debate, ROTC detachments can go a long way towards ending prejudices and accurately

representing the creativity of thinking that goes on within the services. Additionally, ROTC outreach should emphasize that, whether or not one has a particular affinity for it, understanding the military is a necessary part of being an informed citizen. The Armed Forces are too big, too influential, and too important to ignore.

Finally, the DoD should direct the Service Academies to reduce the bureaucratic and institutional barriers to participation in civil-military programming. Cadets and midshipmen are currently constrained in their ability to visit civilian colleges for academic programming or participate in overseas research trips. As a former co-chair of ALLIES, I have seen the lengths our military peers must go too to participate in some of our programming. The Academies should recognize the training value of civil-military events and make more allowances for student involvement.

Conclusion

The ALLIES model of undergraduate civil-military education represents an opportunity to help foster and build today the WoG leaders we will need tomorrow. By engaging with students at the undergraduate level, before they have begun their careers, this model can help to avoid the cultural, institutional, and bureaucratic pushback that occurs higher up the professional ladder. What's more, it allows students to begin their professional development with an intuitive understanding of the need for comprehensive interagency cooperation. Those students who do not ultimately enter government or military service will benefit as well. Strong undergraduate civil-military education will invest future professionals with an appreciation for the institution of the military and for the WoG process as a means of achieving national objectives, making them better, more informed citizens.

In 1889, Sir William Francis Butler wrote, "the nation that insists on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools, and its thinking done by cowards." By neglecting the undergraduate arena, the U.S. government is missing an opportunity to help close today's civil-military gap with the next generation of college graduates. Through broad support of undergraduate education programs, the USG can help restore a personal relationship between those who fight America's wars and the wider population that stands behind them.

2ndLt Jesse Sloman is an intern in PKSOI's Operational Integration Division. He is a recent graduate of Tufts University, where he majored in political science and served as co-chair of the Alliance Linking Leaders in Education and the Services (ALLIES). He will attend the U.S. Marine Corps Basic Officer Course in October.

¹Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Manhattan, Kansas (26 November 2007), ²Andrew J. Bacevich, Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee (9 April 2008),

³David L. Leal, "American Public Opinion Toward the Military." *Armed Forces & Society*, (Vol. 32, No. 1: 2005), 123, ⁴George W. Bush, *National Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, July 2007), 1, ⁵"Christopher Hellman and Travis Sharp, "The FY 2009 Pentagon Spending Request – Global Military Spending," *Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation* (22 February 2008). http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/securityspending/articles/fy09_dod_request_global/ (accessed 10 July 2009), ⁶ Eliot A. Cohen, "Neither Fools nor Cowards," *American Enterprise Institute* (18 May 2005). <http://www.aei.org/issue/22542> (accessed 8 May 2009).



National Defense University's Lincoln Hall
Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington D.C.

New! Conferences and Workshops

October 27-29, 2009 Stability Operations Training and Education Workshop

2009 Stability Operations Training and Education Workshop The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) in concert with its co-sponsors: the National Defense University, Consortium for Complex Operations, George Mason University, United States Institute of Peace, US Army Combined Arms Center, State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and the Naval Post Graduate School; will conduct the Workshop at Fort McNair's Lincoln Hall from 27 to 29 October, 2009.

This annual event brings together education and training practitioners from the stability and peace operation community of practice and provides a forum to:

- examine processes in order to create synergies among current education and training efforts
- identify best practices
- provide recommendations to improve peace and stability operations training and education programs.

For more information on the event please contact Mr. Todd Wheeler at 717-245-4479, or COL Main at 717-245-4479 @ [e-mail](mailto:todd.wheeler@pksoi.mil)

PKSOI's CDR Bruno Himmler Awarded Three Medals for Service in Iraq



From Left to right: Director of PKSOI COL John Kardos, USPHS, United States Public Health Service CDR Bruno Himmler currently assigned to PKSOI. With his wife Mary.

Commander Bruno Himmler above is presented three awards for Hazardous duty, Foreign duty, and Isolation Hardship duty for his service in Iraq. The Director of PKSOI COL John Kardos presented the awards. During his tour in Iraq, he acted primarily as the liaison between the U.S. Embassy, the Iraqi Ministry of Health, and multiple non-governmental organizations (NGOs). As part of his duties, he assisted the Minister of Health rebuild the Iraqi health care system. He worked to ensure the completion of a pediatric hospital in Basra and oversaw the building of several smaller primary care facilities; however, his work extended far beyond building physical capital by ensuring that health care staff in Iraq received appropriate initial and continuing training.

Nathaniel Teichman, an Intern from Tufts University receives a PKSOI Certificate of Excellence



Evolving to Interagency Command and Control at the Operational Level:

A Challenge in Stability Operations for U.S. Landpower

By Dr. Kevin D. Stringer

Introduction

The United States (U.S.) military, particularly its landpower component represented by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, must develop an interagency operational command and control approach with partner agencies in order to master a future filled with stability operations. Such a future maintains continuity with the past since contrary to popular belief, the military history of the United States is one characterized by stability operations, interrupted only by distinct episodes of major combat.

This essay will argue that landpower success in stability operations will require true interagency command structures at the operational level with the concurrent development of a more effective interagency “culture” for these missions. It will show that the future probability of military engagement in stability operations is high. It will then define the applicable principles of unity of command and unity of effort and then provide short historical vignettes where interagency cooperation in stability operations has been sub-optimal. Finally, the paper will offer organizational proposals for moving the Department of Defense (DOD), represented by the U.S. Army, and its brethren civilian agencies, particularly the Department of State, along the path to successful interagency command and control of stability operations. This path ultimately leads to civilian command of landpower for such missions. While the command of stability operations has an integral air, naval and often multinational component, this article concentrates solely on the landpower aspect, primarily the U.S. Army and its potential interagency partners, for reasons of focus and relevance. This approach was chosen since landpower, broadly speaking, bears the brunt of the planning and execution for such missions.

Stability operations are defined as various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. on population control, security, and development activities.



Military forces, drawn heavily from the U.S. Army, are primarily engaged in stability operations in order to establish, safeguard, or restore basic civil services. They act directly and in support of government agencies. Stability operations often involve both coercive and cooperative actions. They lead to an environment in which the other instruments of national power can predominate.

The very definition of stability operations raises the issue of how to command and control endeavors that are by nature joint, interagency, and often multinational. Since the U.S. government will continue to conduct stability operations in the future, the United States defense establishment must develop a comprehensive view to integrating military landpower with its interagency partners for these deployments. Although stability operations are an interagency and intergovernmental effort, challenges and shortcomings in coordinating and resourcing efforts across Executive Branch departments often results in the U.S. Army carrying a disproportionate burden in conducting these operations. While the U.S. Army will play a critical role in executing stability operations, and bear some significant responsibility for planning in the pre-execution phase of stability operations, it will not be alone. Throughout the planning and execution cycle, the Army is directly participating with organizations throughout the government to define the most appropriate or essential roles for the military and civilian agencies in stability operations.

Landpower for stability operations becomes essentially a holistic mix of capabilities drawn from the U.S. Army, and a host of other federal agencies. A partial listing of these agencies include the Department of State (DOS), U.S. Agency for International Aid (USAID), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of Agriculture, and others. A critical challenge will be establishing unity of effort and command over such diverse institutions and structuring appropriate command organizations at the operational level for maximum effectiveness in the civil-military context.

To read all of Dr. Stringer's USAWC Foundation award winning essay please click on the link below:

[\[Go to complete article with notes\]](#)

Dr. Kevin D. Stringer is a 1987 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, and has served as an Active and Reserve Component officer in the U.S. Army, and as a Foreign Service officer with the Department of State. He holds an MA in international relations from Boston University, and a PhD. in History and International Security from the University of Zurich. A U.S. Army Command and General Staff College graduate, he is the author of the book *Military Organizations for Homeland Defense and Smaller-Scale Contingencies* (Praeger Security International, 2006). He teaches as an adjunct Professor of Security Studies at the Baltic Defence College in Tartu, Estonia.

Health Care Diplomacy: the Iraq Experience and How it Can Shape the Future.

by CDR Bruno Himmeler

Iraqi Health Status 2007

I entered Baghdad, Iraq at the beginning of September 2007 to an environment of continued decay and instability. This was not the result of a single event or act of aggression, but rather a series of events that began 25 years ago under the rule of Saddam Hussein. Corruption had riddled Iraqi ministries and the Ministry of Health was no exception. According to the article by Larry Kaplow, things got worse than ever after 2005, when loyalists of the radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr gained control of the Health Ministry. Hospitals turned into Shi'ite militia bases where Sunnis could be killed on sight.

The Ministry of Health was without a leader for six months; targeted threats against the educated middle class and Iraqi leaders caused the Minister to flee the country and seek asylum in the United States. Instead of filling the vacant Ministry of Health position, the Iraqi Government attempted to fill the gap by having the Minister of Displaced Victims and Migration serve as the acting Minister of Health.

Since 2003, approximately 8,000 doctors, most of them specialists, had abandoned jobs at government health centers since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, most seeking refuge abroad and a few hundred heading to the relative safety of Iraq's Kurdish region. Their departure further crippled a health-care system plagued by corruption, mismanagement and a lack of equipment and drugs. As noted above, the health care system had been decimated by the exodus of 50 to 60% of the health care work force and those who remained were without hope. As violence in Iraq worsened, doctors and healthcare workers became "soft targets" for insurgent activities; at least 620 medical professionals, including 134 doctors, have been killed or threatened. To gain a perspective of what was happening in Iraq, we need to start back 25 years ago when Saddam Hussein took charge of the country. Under his dictatorship, the old health care system was a socialistic system that fostered corruption and shortages. As noted by Rebecca Voelker, the old Iraqi system was a dual system as doctors worked in the morning for the public sector and afternoons in the private sector for fee for service, which led to corruption and devaluation of the public sector. As Saddam entered into war with his neighbors, the budget of Iraq's Ministry of Health was severely reduced resulting in poorly



maintained infrastructure and poor services to the Iraqi people. Equipment was purchased by United Nation's Oil-for-Food (OFF) Program, which still sits today unused due to lack of training and follow through with installation and maintenance. Doctors reflect that for nearly three decades not only was the healthcare system neglected, but they were deprived of the opportunities to study abroad and improve their skills.



Touring new primary health clinic in Irbil with Kurdistan Minister of Health, Dr. Zyran Yones (right side of picture).

The health care system demise was therefore multi-factorial: lack of infrastructure maintenance for over 20 years, lack of continuing education opportunities for health care workers, exodus of workers due to violence from 2003-2007 and corruption infiltration from the highest to the lowest levels.

New leadership in Ministry of Health (MoH)

Changes to Iraq's healthcare system began at the end of November when the Government of Iraq announced that Dr Salih M. Al Hasnawi, the Director General of Health from Karbala and Psychiatrist by training, would serve as the Minister of Health. By this time, the position had been vacant for nearly eight months and Dr. Salih would be the seventh named Minister in four years. Dr. Salih [Iraqis tend to refer to doctors by their first names instead of last] brought to the organization a committed desire for reform and reconstruction of the health care system. Implementing his vision would be a grand task that required determination in the face of great security obstacles and bureaucratic hurdles.

[\[Go to complete article with notes\]](#)

Commander Bruno Himmeler is a member of the active component of the U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) and currently serves as the Health and Humanitarian Assistance Advisor for PKSOI at the U.S. Army War College.



New! PKSOI Book Review Website Page

The new PKSOI Book review page will feature books on the various topics related to Peace and Stability Operations with reviews by both the authors themselves and Subject Matter Experts (SME). ([Click here to view page](#))

New! PKSOI Website BLOG Page

"Civil Affairs at PKSOI" takes on issues of civil-military integration and military operations within humanitarian space and solicits readers' responses to questions posed on these topics as well as readers' suggestions on how the United States can ethically and effectively conduct overseas contingency operations. Bottom line, Colonel Bryan Groves is trying to figure out how to save the village without first destroying it, and he needs your help in finding answers.

Year of the Non-Commissioned Officer The NCO in Peace and Stability Operations

The linked article published by the American Legion Magazine features a story about an Infantry Platoon Sergeant, Sergeant First Class Jack Robison and his "boots on the ground" perspective of the historical rebuilding and transformation of Ramadi, Iraq. <http://www.legion.org/magazine/1482/fresh-paint>



New at PKSOI...

Stability Operations, Force Modernization Proponency Designated

In January 2009, Headquarters, Department of the U.S. Army (HQDA) designated the Commander of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as the U.S. Army force modernization proponent for Stability Operations and Security Force Assistance.

The inclusion of Stability Operations as a component of the whole-of-government focus area in ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) work underscores its importance within the defense community. The Army's, Stability Operations and Security Force Assistance community agreed that designating force modernization proponency for these areas was necessary in order to achieve Army-wide institutionalization of these important concepts. By designating proponency, the Army is demonstrating its commitment to recently published doctrine on Stability Operations and Security Force Assistance and adapting the institution to meet the current and future requirements of combatant commanders.

In accordance with Army Regulation 5-22, *The Army Force Modernization Proponent System*, a force modernization proponent executes force management responsibilities relative to DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership development and education, personnel, and facilities) for its particular function and ensures DOTMLPF actions are coordinated across the Army. HQDA remains responsible for policy and strategy development reflective of Department of Defense (DoD) direction.

Following designation, the Army Stability Operations and Security Force Assistance Proponency Office established an initial operating capability at Fort Leavenworth. This office has been active in forming a common operating picture for stakeholders and developing a Campaign Plan that builds upon work to date such as the Army Action Plan for Stability Operations.

Gregory Wick has been supporting the Army Stability Operations Office, HQDA G-3/5/7, as a senior military analyst since June 2006. Prior to becoming a DoD contractor with SYColeman, and later MPRI, he served 26 years as a field artillery officer and Middle East foreign area officer in the United States Army.

The "Advisory and Assistance" Brigade: What It Is and What It Is Not

In an interview on *Meet the Press* with David Gregory on March 1, 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that while the bulk of the US military transitions out of Iraq, the remaining units "will be called **advisory and assistance brigades**." Since that interview, the term "advisory and assistance brigade"—or, "AAB"—has become part of the US Army parlance, even though the Army has no plans to add it to the doctrinal lexicon. Though at first glance this may seem inconsistent, it is important to understand what "advisory and assistance" means to the US Army—and what it doesn't mean.

While Secretary Gates was giving his interview on *Meet the Press*, the doctrine writers at the US Army's Training and Doctrine Command, or TRADOC, were already in the final editing stages of US Army Field Manual Interim 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance* (SFA). This interim field manual currently defines SFA as "the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority." Two of the several tasks considered fundamental to the SFA mission are to "advise" and to "assist." The other tasks include "organize," "train," "equip," and "rebuild." Consequently, a brigade that is assigned tasks that include "advising and assisting" a foreign security force is in fact conducting SFA operations.

Perhaps one of the most critical elements for the future success of US government operations in Iraq is the military change of mission from combat operations to Stability Operations. In accordance with the Status of Forces Agreement, any brigade remaining in Iraq after August 31, 2010, is there only to conduct SFA as partners with Iraqi Security Forces. To emphasize this change of mission, these brigades conducting SFA in Iraq are generally referred to as "AABs" during their deployment. So, given the immediate projection of recurrent mission of 'advise and assist' for our next deploying Brigades, why not add the term "AABs" to our US Army doctrine? Although it appears an easy choice to apply our current vernacular to our doctrine, it is not.



New! PKSOI in the News!!!

“CSIS Critical Questions”

Critical Questions is a short analysis prepared by CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) experts. They are a quick and easy read designed to get to the heart of the matter. The links provided below will feature two *Critical Questions* answered by: CSIS/PKSOI’s Mr. Nathan Freier.

1. [The Departure of U.S. Forces from Iraq’s Cities](#)
2. [The Impending Withdrawal from Iraq and Its Implications.](#)

Mr. Nathan Freier *a senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., a visiting research professor at the U.S. Army War College’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, and a former Army strategist with experience in Iraq.*



One of the most important US Army lessons learned of the past eight years is that flexibility is absolutely critical to military success in an environment dominated by irregular threats. Yet, ironically, advocates of a U.S. Army creation of a *permanent* advisory organization do not appear to recognize that this may reinforce inflexibility in our forces. Instead, we need to recognize that the US Army’s current modular brigades are flexible enough to adapt to the advisory mission, yet still maintain the capability to meet the full range of possible missions. Consequently, while the current situation in Iraq may require brigades conducting SFA be referred to as AABs, it does not warrant changing the Army’s SFA doctrine into some type of AAB doctrine.

The fundamental concept of the modular brigade does not change with the assignment of a new mission—be it SFA or any other. “Advise” and “assist” are tasks associated with the mission of SFA, and this mission can be assigned to any of the Army’s 73 brigade combat teams. Further, security force assistance is a critical component of stability operations, now of equal importance with the more traditional tasks of offense and defense and an important US government tool in the application of “smart power.” As the operational and strategic environment changes, so changes the mission. The flexible and versatile modular brigade can be augmented, adapted, and trained to accomplish any mission across the spectrum of conflict.


MAJ Bill Torrey *is a Strategic Plans and Policy officer in the Stability Operations Division on the Army Staff. His recent experiences include being a Special Forces advisor to security forces in Iraq, Mali, and Morocco.*



U.S Army soldiers training Iraqi soldiers.



Continuing Promise 2009 Mission Journal by Commander Bruno Himmler, MD
PKSOI's Chief Health & Humanitarian Assistance Advisor



CDR Bruno Himmler, MD – 3rd from the left

Continuing Promise 2009 is an annual humanitarian civic assistance operation supported by U.S. and international military medical personnel, U.S. government agencies, regional health ministries, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and U.S. academic institutions. U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command and U.S. 4th Fleet (NAVSO/4th Fleet) are the main planning and coordination commands for the Continuing Promise mission.

Commander Bruno Himmler is a member of the active component of the U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) and currently serves as the Health and Humanitarian Assistance Advisor for PKSOI at the U.S. Army War College. Previously, he served three years with the U.S. Navy as a Medical Officer and one year in Iraq as the Health Attaché in Baghdad.

CDR Himmler is serving aboard the USNS COMFORT as a Medical Doctor assigned to a medical team with the primary focus to provide a range of health care services ashore. On a case-by-case basis, select patients will receive certain medical or dental care on the ship.

Follow the journey and learn more about Operation Continuing Promise <http://www.southcom.mil/appssc/factfiles.php?id=103>

The next pages will feature journal entries from CDR Bruno Himmler aboard the USNS COMFORT.



July 8, 2009

The last 3 days have been very busy. We are seeing approximately 1000 patients daily, between medical, dental and optometry. In medical we are seeing about 700 patients. Most of the people have troubles with various body pains and stomach problems. It is an hour drive from the hotel to our site. We get to view the active volcano during most of the trip. There is steam coming out of the top of San Corinto and the last eruption was in 1973.

Along the highway we pass many bicycles, tractors and ox or donkey carts. Last night, the hotel complex had an electrical fire by a shed. It provided us with some 4th of July fireworks, though a bit late.

We were without power for a few hours and we were grateful it was restored around 9pm so we could have ac in the room. The food for dinner has been superb. I will spend tomorrow morning working at the site again and we hope our relief will arrive around noon and then we are scheduled to head back to the ship.

The USNS Comfort had to move due to rough seas and people are having trouble getting back and forth each day. We are hoping tomorrow will be a calmer day and we can return without difficulty. Attached is a picture of me doing patient care and of an Army helicopter from JTF Bravo that is helping with personnel movement ashore. Not often you see Army helicopters landing on Navy ships!



July 05, 2009

This weekend I spent time conversing with the US Surgeon General during his visit.

RADM Galson was given a tour of the ship on Saturday and had a formal dinner with the PHS Officers, Senior Navy Staff, along with representatives from Nicaragua, El Salvador, Project Hope and the LDS.

He was impressed by the joint medical mission being conducted on board and how well everyone was working as one team. He also enjoyed talking to us about our experience working with the local communities in El Salvador and Nicaragua. RADM Galson went ashore this morning and was able to tour all the medical and veterinary sites to see firsthand the work being done. The VIP party was also treated to a local concert at the town square in Corino.

Tomorrow, I will be heading out for 4 days to work at the remote site of Somatillo. I will be able to spend the evenings at a local hotel, so I can get a break from the rocking of the ship. The seas have been picking up in the evenings and those folks without prior Navy experience are still trying to get their sea legs. Somatillo is close to the Honduran border, so we are watching closely the events as they unfold in Honduras. So far, there has not been any political rhetoric at the locations where we are working, just thankful people appreciating all that we provide.

July 2, 2009

Greetings from USNS Comfort underway off the coasts of El Salvador and Nicaragua. Today we set sail to move to our next and final stop on the 4 month deployment. Tomorrow teams will head out to the various sites in Nicaragua and start to set up for patient care starting on July 4th. So, while you all are relaxing having picnics and shooting off fireworks, we will be sweltering in the tropical humid heat. Also, the US Surgeon General, RADM Galson, will be visiting the USNS Comfort 04-05 July. He will have time to see the different sites and meet with the 14 PHS Officers on board. I plan to spend time on 04-05 July in the Operating Theaters and hope to scrub in on a few cases. During the past couple of days, I had the opportunity to talk to some of the key Navy Medical folks that have been involved with the planning and operations of the mission.



The humanitarian assistance mission has evolved significantly since CP 2007. International health professionals are coming on board and are learning from the DOD medical staff about current practices and operative procedures.

There is also nursing and dental exchange programs and teaching of ACLS and PALS to local staff. Preventative Medicine has also significantly increased their presence and efforts doing multiple site visits and looking at issues regarding clean water, sanitation, vector control, etc. Another significant change is the amount of NGO presence. LDS Church has sent volunteers for the entire 4 months to include medical staff and interpreters, Project Hope is providing doctors and nursing staff, University of California, San Diego has pre-dental and pre-medical students, and lastly, Project Smile is bringing aboard 50 international health specialists to do cleft lip and cleft palate surgeries in Nicaragua. I will have an opportunity to spend 4 days and 3 nights at a remote site close to the Honduran border and 1 day at a closer site providing primary medical care. I will also provide sick call coverage for a couple days on the ship and spend one day covering the Continuing Promise Operation Center (CPOC) where we track personnel movement to and from the ship to make sure no one gets left behind and trouble shoot any issues that arise during the day.

June 30, 2009

I am spending the afternoon covering sick call aboard the ship. Yesterday, I was able to follow a couple of the surgeons aboard and observe some of the surgical cases. The team does an excellent job of preparing the patients for surgery. Many of the embarked staff speak Spanish very well which helps tremendously. The OR suites are as what we would see in a normal hospital. We often forget we are on a ship while in the OR suite except when the ship rocks back and forth. This necessitates the need to keep things anchored down so they don't roll away. This morning, there were members of the El Salvadorian Ministry of Health aboard that provided lectures on malaria and Chaga's Disease. Overall, it sounds like they have implemented a very successful eradication plan for malaria. In 1978 there were over 30,000 cases, this year they have had only 6 cases. Tomorrow will mark the end of the mission here in El Salvador. We will head to Nicaragua on Thursday and set up for the final mission on Friday.

June 27, 2009

I was seeing patients in the small town of Ramon Mendosa in El Salvador. We saw over 300 patients in the morning between 6 providers. Many of the patients were in fairly good health and receiving medical care locally. They have to buy their medications so many came to us to see if we could help them out. I did see one young female, 22 y/o with 2 spinal cord tumors. The local surgeons are afraid to do surgery on her as they could paralyze her if they are not careful. Her husband is trying to find someone who can do surgery or sponsor her to go to the United States for surgery.

The COMFORT does not have neurosurgery capability, so we could not help her. We told them to seek out help with the Ministry of Health representatives at the site and possibly with Rotary International. Her uncle also had similar problem and died due to complications from the tumor. Another older lady, 42 yrs old came in with a breast lump for 6 months. Her mother and sister have been both diagnosed with breast cancer. We referred her to Ministry of Health for a biopsy. I will rest tomorrow on board the ship and will head out again Monday Morning to another site (El Carmen).

June 25, 2009

I finished my first day working in La Union at a make shift clinic at a school. We saw approx 50 patients each with various ailments. We try to provide some relief from suffering, but realize we cannot do much for long term problems. The surgical teams on the USNS Comfort are doing up to 200 cases a day, often significant life changing surgeries. There are people representing all the services on board, both officers and enlisted. The NGO community also has representatives from Project Hope, UVA Medical School, and many civilian volunteers serving as interpreters or surgeons. I will try to forward on some photos as they become available. I also got to spend time with the CO of the MTF on board and see how they are handling dealing with tactical issues as they arise. Good news is that there are many nursing, dental students aboard the Comfort from El Salvador that are learning from our teams and we also have education teams going ashore to provide training to the local medical staff. Meds as expected remain a critical issue. [See complete journal](#)



SOLLIMS

Stability Operations Lessons Learned Information Management System (SOLLIMS)

SOLLIMS Technical Update:

- We continue to work on improving both existing functions /capabilities and on adding additional capabilities for the SOLLIMS users. Most recently, we have implemented the "DISCUSSIONS GROUPS" function. Using the link in the left column on the main page, users will be taken to a new section of SOLLIMS that allows them to view and participate in ongoing public forums, blogs and to initiate their own forums. Select members may also initiate a new blog; users may use the "FEEDBACK" or "EMAIL US" links to request permissions to set up a new blog.

- SOLLIMS forums are intended to be a place where members can discuss issues and observations (O&Rs) already catalogued within the SOLLIMS dB, or to develop new content.

- The first time you use the "DISCUSSIONS GROUPS" link, you will be prompted to enter your logon information –

> your **User Name** is just your first name and last name (as show in your SOLLIMS MyProfile) grouped together with no spaces – e.g. JohnSmith; note how the first letters of the names are capitalized.

> your password is the same as your existing SOLLIMS password.

*** Make sure you check the option to 'logon automatically' – by doing so you will not have to logon for any subsequent visits to the forums area.



Also new is a 4-page concise overview of SOLLIMS major functions and what the various menu items do or allow you to do. Note the new link on the login/registration page for "[SOLLIMS Functions and Capabilities](#)." This is a good reference for all users – download and keep handy while you're learning how to best use SOLLIMS for your needs and interests.

Coming Soon:

>>>Shared Libraries – separate menu items from the main page where you will be able to find many SOLLIMS Tutorials, doctrinal manuals, national and regional policy memorandums, key studies (e.g. RAND, CSIS). These libraries will be tailorable by member area and will provide a key, valuable repository where our user can do 'one-stop- shopping' for these references. (July'09)

>>> Data Indexing / Advanced Search – implementation of an advanced data indexing and search engine; redesign of the search return screens in SOLLIMS. (Aug '09)

>>> Multi-lingual instructions and tutorials – in particular Spanish, French (FY09) and German (FY10); we are also investigating the possibility of Russian !

Coming in FY10 :

>>> Experts Page: – callup member information; search on name, expertise, etc. Enhanced MyProfile data to include the ability to attach a personal biography.

>>> Improved AAR Builder / Report Builder – enhanced 'block-copy-paste' functionality; formatting tools (block quotes, bullet lists); more options for pre-configured report formats.

>>> Multi-tier search – select from current tier, whole-site, or user selected tiers.



Click on logo above to go to SOLLIMS and register for your own personal account.